đ° The Unity of Consciousness
Author: plato.stanford.edu
Full Title: The Unity of Consciousness
URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-unity/
Human consciousness usually displays a striking unity. When one
experiences a noise and, say, a pain, one is not conscious of the
noise and then, separately, of the pain. One is conscious of the noise
and pain together, as aspects of a single conscious experience. Since
at least the time of Immanuel Kant (1781/7), this phenomenon has been
called the unity of consciousness.
When I consider the mind, that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking thing, I cannot distinguish in myself any parts, but apprehend myself to be clearly one and entire. [Descartes 1641: 196]
Notice where it is that I cannot
distinguish any parts. It is in âmyself inasmuch as I am only a
thinking thingâ (ibid.); that is, in myself as a
wholeâwhich requires unified consciousness of myself as a whole.
The claim is that this subject, the target of this unified
consciousness, is not a composite of parts.
In Kant (1781/7), the notion that consciousness is unified is central
to his âtranscendental deduction of the categoriesâ
Kant claims that in order to
tie various objects of experience together into a single unified
conscious experience of the world, we must be able to apply certain
concepts to the items in question.
It should have followed from his atomism that
there is no unified consciousness, just âa bundle of different
perceptionsâ ([1739] 1962: 252). Yet, in a famous appendix, he
says that there is something he cannot render consistent with his
atomism (p. 636). He never tells us what it is but it may have been
that consciousness strongly appears to be more than a bundle of
independent âperceptionsâ.
No medical procedure to do with consciousness has received as much
philosophical attention in recent times as commissurotomies, more
commonly known as brain bisection operations. Nagel (1971) was perhaps
the first philosopher to write on them; his paper continues to be
influential. Since then, Puccetti (1973, 1981), Marks (1981), Hirsch
(1991), Lockwood (1989), Hurley (1998), Bayne (2008, 2010), Schechter
(2010) and many, many other philosophers have written on these
operations. Indeed, the strange results of these operations in certain
controlled conditions was one of the things that brought the unity of
consciousness back onto the cognitive research agenda.
In normal life, patients show little effect of the operation. In
particular, their consciousness of their world and themselves appears
to remain as unified as it was prior to the operation. How this can be
has puzzled a lot of people (Hurley 1998). Even more interesting for
our purposes, however, is that, under certain laboratory conditions,
these patients seem to behave as though two âcentres of
consciousnessâ have been created in them. The original unity
seems to be gone and two centres of unified consciousness seem to have
replaced it, each associated with one of the two cerebral
hemispheres.
In some particularly severe forms of schizophrenia, the victim seems
to lose the ability to have an integrated, interrelated experience of
his or her world and self altogether. The person speaks in âword
saladsâ that never get anywhere, indeed sometimes never become
complete sentences. The person is unable to put together perceptions,
beliefs and motives into even simple plans of action or act on such
plans if formed, even plans to obtain sustenance, tend to bodily
needs, escape painful irritants, and so on. Here, it is plausible to
suggest that the unity of consciousness has shattered rather than
split.
In the history of European philosophy at least since Locke, diachronic
unified consciousness has been closely linked to personal identity in
the philosopherâs sense, i.e., continuing to be a single Person,
one and the same person, across time.
Dennett articulates an even more radical view, on both unity and the architecture of it. For him, unified consciousness of âselfâ is simply a short-lasting âvirtual captainâ coming to be as a result of a small group of information-parcels gaining temporary dominance in a struggle with other such groups for control of such cognitive activities as self-monitoring and self-reporting. We take these transient phenomena to be more than they are because each of them is the âmeâ of the moment and they are tied to earlier transient selves by the special form of autobiographical memory identified earlier. If the temporary coalition of conscious states that is winning at the moment is what I am, is the self, each temporal chunk of âselfâ is likely to be found in different parts of the brain from other such chunks and there will be many NCCs of unified consciousness in many different places.