IntentionalityIncoming Links📙 Being-In-The-WorldHeidegger countered that there wasa more basic form of Intentionality than that of a self-sufficient individual subject directed at the world by means of its mental content. At the foundation of Heidegger's new approach is a phenomenology of "…Everything, then, turns on Heidegger's critique of Husserl's theory of Intentionality. As Heidegger says:Here again we have a term and concept taken so much for granted that no one lingers with it for long and, even in a preparatory stage, assumes it is the solution to the problem, as if it were surely the key to all doors. On the contrary, we should make what is itself meant by the term into the problem. (MFL, 132)The above description of the skilled use of Equipment enables Heidegger to introduce both a new kind of Intentionality (absorbed coping) which is not that of a Mind with content directed toward objects, and a new sort of entity encountered (transparent Equipment) which is not a determinate, isolable substance.